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I. Introduction
Over the past thirty years, states have relied increasingly on
nonbinding agreements to govern space activities, and this practice
has produced considerable debate among academics and
* Brian Wessel (Harvard, J.D., 2011; Cambridge, LL.M., 2010) is an attorney
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practitioners. Since the 1980s, the international community has used
nonbinding instruments rather than binding treaties to coordinate
cooperation in outer space. Recently, academics have begun using
the concept of the rule of law to criticize this reliance on nonbinding
agreements and to encourage a return to formal space treaties.
Stephan Hobe of the University of Cologne in Germany, for
example, has argued that this shift away from binding treaties has
significantly reduced compliance with the rule of law. This
departure from rule of law, Hobe argues, has damaged the
legitimacy and effectiveness of international space law.
However, rule of law has taken many forms over decades and
centuries of jurisprudence, and the recent scholarship on rule of law
in outer space has not attempted to elucidate which form of rule of
law it is applying or should be applying. Two main types of rule of
law presented by legal theorists are formal rule of law and
substantive rule of law. Formal rule of law, which looks only at
how "law-like" the rules in a legal system are, and substantive rule
of law, which judges a legal system based on whether its rules are
"good" or "bad," can lead to very different prescriptions when
applied to a specific legal order. This Article undertakes a more indepth examination of rule of law theory in order to evaluate the
validity of recent arguments applying the rule of law to space law.
With the benefit of a more complete understanding of rule of law
theory, it becomes clear that current international space law adheres
much more closely to the rule of law than has previously been
suggested. This conclusion, in turn, has broader implications for the
use of nonbinding agreements as policy instruments for
international cooperation in general.

II. The Basic Structure of International Space Law
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union made an unexpected
announcement: it had just placed the first artificial satellite in Earth
orbit.1 The satellite, Sputnik 1, contained two radio transmitters; its
distinctive "beep-beep-beep," which could be heard worldwide by
anyone with a short-wave radio receiver as Sputnik I passed
1. Although it was common knowledge that both the Soviet Union and the
United States were developing artificial satellites, neither country was expected to
be ready to attempt a launch until 1958 at the earliest. Roger D. Launius, Sputnik
and the Origins of the Space Age, NASA HISTORY PROGRAMS OFFICE, http://history.
nasa.gov/ sputnik/ sputorig.html.
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overhead, served as a clear and startlingly tangible proclamation
that the space age had begun.2 Less than a year later and directly in
response to this news, the United States Congress passed the
National Aeronautics and Space Act creating NASA. 3 Within only
twelve years, Neil Armstrong would become the first person to set
foot on the moon.
The launch of Sputnik 1 was a wake-up call not only to the
international political and scientific communities, but also to the
international legal community. In 1958, the United Nations General
Assembly established the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS or COPUOS) as an ad
hoc committee, and the General Assembly formally established
COPUOS as a permanent committee the following year.4 COPUOS
meets annually to consider issues raised by the General Assembly
and COPUOS member states, and it submits reports and makes
recommendations to the General Assembly.5 With seventy-one
member states, COPUOUS is one of the United Nations' largest
committees. 6 COPUOS has two subcommittees, the Scientific and
Technical Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommittee, which are
made up of experts in those respective fields. Decisions within
COPUOS are usually made by unanimous consensus among
committee member states. Most multilateral space agreements have
been negotiated through COPUOS and adopted by the General
Assembly. The General Assembly's space policies are implemented
by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA).

2. James

J. Harford, Korolev's Triple Play: Sputniks 1, 2, and 3, NASA HISTORY

PROGRAMS OFFICE, http:/ / history.nasa.gov/ sputnik/ harford.html; SMITHSONIAN
NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE MUSEUM, Milestones of Flight: Sputnik 1, http://www.

A recording of Sputnik I's radio
nasm.si.edu/exhibitions/gallOO/sputnik.html.
signal is available from the NASA History Programs Office at http://
history.nasa.gov/sputnik/sputnik.wav.
3. NASA HISTORY PROGRAMS OFFICE, Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age,

http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/
4. International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res.
1472, U.N. GAOR., 14th Sess., 856th plen. mtg., at 5, U.N. Doc. A/4354,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/gares/html/gares_14_1472.html.
5.

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS COMM.

ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/

COPUOS/copuos.html.
6. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS COMM.
ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE: MEMBER STATES, http://www.oosa.

unvienna.org/oosa/en/COPUOS/members.html.
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A. International Space Agreements
The brief history of international space agreements can be
divided into three periods. The first period, covering the 1960s and
1970s, is characterized by the conclusion of binding space treaties.
The first, the 1967 Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies ("Outer Space Treaty"), 7 has been
called a "constitution for outer space." 8 It sets down basic principles
governing states' activities in outer space, including a prohibition on
claims of extraterrestrial territory (Art. II), a prohibition on placing
weapons of mass destruction in space (Art. III), and a requirement
that space exploration be carried out for the benefit of all countries
as "the province of all mankind" (Art. I). The Outer Space Treaty
also contains general provisions on assistance to astronauts (Art. V),
international responsibility for all national space activities (Art. VI),
and jurisdiction over space objects (Art VIII). The Outer Space
Treaty is widely ratified, with 101 states parties as of 2012.9
The next three treaties, also negotiated and concluded through
COPUOS, elaborate on general provisions of the Outer Space Treaty.
The 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space
("Rescue Agreement") sets down specific provisions requiring states
to provide assistance to astronauts in case of emergency and to
return to the launching state astronauts who have made an
The 1972 Convention on International
emergency landing.10
Caused by Space Objects ("Liability
for
Damage
Liability
Convention") holds a launching state strictly liable for damage
caused by its space objects to objects or people on the Earth's surface
or to aircraft in flight, and it holds a launching state liable on a
7. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for
signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10,
1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
8. Helmet Tuerk, The Negotiation of the "Moon Agreement", 52 PROC. OF THE
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 491, 493 (2010).

9. U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, TREATY DATABASE, http://www.un
oosa.org/oosatdb/showTreatySignatures.do [hereinafter TREATY DATABASE] (last
visited Apr. 4, 2012).
10. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, U.N. GAOR, 22nd
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1968), 19 U.S.T. 7570 [hereinafter
Rescue Agreement].
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negligence standard for damage caused in space by its space
objects." Finally, the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space ("Registration Convention") provides
more detailed requirements and procedures for registration of space
objects in a register maintained by the U.N. Secretary-General. 12 The
Rescue Agreement, Liability Convention, and Registration
Convention are all fairly widely ratified, with ninety-two, ninety,
and fifty-seven States Parties, respectively, as of 2012.13
A fifth treaty, the Agreement Governing the Activities of States
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies ("Moon Agreement"), was
adopted by the General Assembly and opened for signature in 1979,
but it has not been widely ratified.14 Although the Moon Agreement
also contains further provisions concerning limitations on military
operations, sharing of scientific information, and nonappropriation
of lunar territory, the centerpiece of the Moon Agreement is a
requirement that any exploitation of lunar resources be carried out
through an international regime that would ensure all states share
equitably in the benefits of those resources. This requirement,
known as the "common heritage of mankind" principle, mirrors a
similar provision in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.15
However, it has proved controversial due to the potential burden
such a requirement could place on the future operations of national
space programs. As a result, only thirteen states have ratified the
Moon Agreement thus far, and none of these states are major space
powers. 16 While the Moon Agreement is currently in force among
its thirteen states parties and has frequently featured prominently in

11. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
Rescue Agreement].
12. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened
for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration
Convention].
13. TREATY DATABASE, supra note 9.
14. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18. 1979, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 77, U.N.
Doc. A/34/46 (1980), 18 I.L.M. 1434 [hereinafter Moon Agreement].
15. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part XI, opened for
signatureDec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3.
16. The Moon Agreement has been ratified by Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Chile, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, The Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru,
the Philippines, and Uruguay. It has been signed but not ratified by France,
Guatemala, India, and Romania. See TREATY DATABASE, supra note 9.
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debates on international space law, it has not had a large practical
impact.17
The second phase of international space law, covering the 1980s
and 1990s, is marked by the use of nonbinding agreements to
develop more specific areas of space law. The 1982 Principles
Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for
International Direct Television Broadcasting ("DBS Principles"), the
1986 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer
Space ("Remote Sensing Principles,") and the 1992 Principles
Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space ("NPS
Principles") were adopted by the General Assembly and provide
nonbinding guidelines in these areas.18 Also included in this
category is the 1996 Declaration on International Cooperation,
which elaborated on the "province of all mankind" principle in
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty. 19 Collectively these agreements
are known as the U.N. Principles on Outer Space or "the Principles."
The third phase of international space law, covering the 2000s,
also encompasses nonbinding agreements negotiated in COPUOS
but focuses on more technical areas of space law. The General
Assembly passed several resolutions reinterpreting specific
provisions of earlier space treaties, including a clarification of the
definition of a "launching state" in 2004 and recommendations on
registration of space objects in 2007.20 The General Assembly also
approved technical guidelines on two important issues in space

17. Jean-Frangois Mayence, Some Legal and Factual Considerationsabout the 1979

UN Moon Agreement, in 52

PROC. OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE

501, 501.
18. Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for
International Direct Television Broadcasting, G.A. Res. 92, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess.,
100th plen. mtg., at 51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/92 (1982); Principles Relating to
Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, G.A. Res. 41/65, U.N. GAOR, 41st
Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 115-16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/65 (1986); The Elaboration of
Draft Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, U.N.
GAOR, COPUOS, 26th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.154/Rev.2 (1987).
19. Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular
Account the Needs of Developing Countries, G.A. Res. 51/122, U.N. GAOR, 39th
Sess., 83rd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/122 (Dec. 13, 1996).
20. Application of the Concept of the "Launching State," G.A. Res. 59/115,
U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/115
(Dec. 10, 2004);
Recommendations on Enhancing the Practice of States and International
Intergovernmental Organizations in Registering Space Objects, G.A. Res. 62/101,
U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/101 (Dec. 17, 2007).
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utilization, orbital debris and nuclear power sources. Millions of
pieces of man-made orbital debris, or "space junk," are currently
orbiting the Earth, some caused by accidents (e.g., the 2009 IridiumCosmos collision between a U.S. commercial satellite and an inactive
Russian defense satellite) and some left or created intentionally (e.g.,
upper stages of rockets left in orbit, and debris from China's 2007
anti-satellite missile test).21 Because satellites, spacecraft, and debris
are moving at an average velocity of ten-to-twelve kilometers per
second, even a very small piece of debris can damage or destroy a
satellite or spacecraft. 22 Cleanup of existing debris is not currently
feasible, but the 2007 COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines
contain recommendations to minimize the creation of orbital debris
in space operations. 23
The other issue recently addressed by the General Assembly
and COPUOS through nonbinding guidelines is nuclear power
sources ("NPS"). NPS in spacecraft include both nuclear reactors
and, more commonly, nonreactor generators that convert heat from
radioactive isotopes' natural decay into electricity. 24 NPS are vital to
exploration of the outer solar system and beyond, where the sun is
too distant to provide adequate solar power, 25 but safety issues have
made their use controversial. The U.S. space program has had three
accidents involving NPS, the first of which dispersed radioactive
material in the upper atmosphere in 1964.26 The Soviet RORSAT

21. SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION, SPACE SUSTAINABILITY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 6-9
(2010). According to the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, there are currently
over 21,000 pieces of orbital debris larger than 10 cm in diameter, approximately
500,000 pieces between 1 cm and 10 cm, and over 100 million particles smaller than
1 cm. Together, the 2007 Chinese anti-satellite missile test and the 2009 IridiumCosmos collision account for approximately one third of all catalogued orbital
debris. NASA ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAM OFFICE, ORBITAL DEBRIS FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS, http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faqs.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).

22. SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION, SPACE SUSTAINABILITY: A
supra note 21, at 12.
23. U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS [OOSA], SPACE

PRACTICAL GUIDE,

DEBRIS MITIGATION
GUIDELINES OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.1/I.260 (2007) [hereinafter SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION GUIDELINES].

24. Steven A. Mirmina & David J. Den Herder, Nuclear Power Sources and Future
Space Exploration, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 149, 151 (2005). The latter type of NPS are called
radioisotope thermoelectric generators, or "RTGs."
25. Currently, most spacecraft using NPS are unmanned probes sent beyond
Earth orbit, but recently NASA has been researching the possibility of using a
nuclear propulsion system in a manned mission to Mars. Id. at 151-57.
26. Id. at 153.

296

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 35:2

program, which used on-board nuclear reactors to power a series of
thirty-two reconnaissance satellites, lost three satellites to accidents,
including an incident in 1978 in which the Cosmos 954 satellite broke
up over the Canadian wilderness, scattering radioactive debris over
an uninhabited area roughly the size of Mississippi.27 In 2009, the
General Assembly, COPUOS, and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) adopted the Nuclear Power Sources Safety
Framework, which addresses concerns arising from incidents such
as these by providing guidelines for the safe use of NPS.28
Also notable is the use in these technical guidelines of selfjudging exceptions. Self-judging exceptions allow a party to deviate
from otherwise applicable rules in various circumstances, with the
party itself left to determine whether the relatively vague criteria
giving rise to the exception are met. Both the Space Debris
Mitigation Guidelines and the NPS Safety Framework include selfjudging exceptions for considerations such as feasibility and mission
cost. Thus, not only are the technical guidelines nonbinding, but
under many conditions largely left up to the spaceflight operator in
question, a deviation from the general rules would sometimes not
be considered a violation at all.
Continuing this trend, recent proposals for future space
agreements have focused on nonbinding codes of conduct. Most
proposed codes of conduct would provide a set of "rules of the
road" for space, covering areas such as orbital debris mitigation,
notification of space activities, and space situational awareness. 29 A
code of conduct would likely be similar to codes of conduct in other
areas, notably the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile

27. Id. at 155-56; FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 117
(2009).
28. U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Scientific and
Technical Subcommittee, & Int'l Atomic Energy Agency, Safety Framework for
Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/934
(2009).
29. Space situational awareness (SSA) refers to efforts to continuously monitor
certain factors that affect the operation of satellites and spacecraft. These factors
include the positions of satellites, the location of space debris large enough to track,
and space weather (e.g., concentrations of charged particles from solar flares).
Because SSA systems require a large number of radio and telescope installations
distributed globally, this area has a high potential for international cooperation and
data sharing. SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION, SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS FACT
SHEET 1 (2010), available at http://swfound.org/media/1800/ssa%20fact%20
sheet.pdf.
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Proliferation.30 Like the Hague Code, such a code would likely
contain both substantive limitations as well as transparency and
confidence-building measures (TCBMs), and it would be explicitly
nonbinding. An eventual code of conduct would be multilateral,
but unlike previous multilateral space agreements it could be
negotiated and concluded outside of the U.N. system. One of the
leading proposals is the European Union's Draft Code of Conduct
for Outer Space Activities, circulated in 2008 and revised in 2010.31
In January of 2012, the United States announced its intention to
work with other space-faring states to develop an International
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, based on the European
Union draft. 32
B. Customary International Law in International Space Law
The final potential source of international space law that must
be considered is customary international law. Many commentators
argue that the content of the nonbinding agreements described
above, from the Principles through the codes of conduct, could
become, or even already have become, binding norms of customary
international law. For example, Wolfgang Rathgeber, Nina-Louisa
Remuss, and Kai-Uwe Schrogl of the European Space Policy
Institute claim that a space code of conduct would likely become
customary international law, and Martha Mejia-Kaiser, co-chair of
the International Institute of Space Law, makes a similar argument
regarding orbital debris mitigation practices. 33 However, closer
30. Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, U.N. GAOR,
59th Sess., 1st comm., 17th meeting, GA/DIS/3286 (Nov. 25, 2002).
31. Council Conclusions and Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities
(EU) No. 17175/08 of 17 Dec. 2008; Council Conclusions Concerning the Revised
Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (EU) No. 14455/10 of 11 Oct. 2010
The Stimson Center has also released a
[hereinafter Council Conclusions].
proposed code of conduct outlining the rights and responsibilities of space-faring
states. STIMSON CENTER, MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR RESPONSIBLE SPACE-FARING

NATIONS (Oct. 24, 2007), http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/model-code-ofconduct-for-responsible-space-faring-nations/.
32. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF

CONDUCT FOR OUTER SPACE (Jan. 17, 2012) (statement of Sec. Hilary Clinton),

available at http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/01/201201
17174801su0.6150128.html; see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS,
STATE DEPARTMENT ON CODE OF CONDUCT FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES:
STRENGTHENING LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY, STABILITY, SAFETY, AND SECURITY IN

SPACE (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/pl/2012/180998.htm.
33. Wolfgang Rathgeber, Nina-Louisa Remuss & Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Space
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analysis of the requirements for customary international law
demonstrates that nonbinding space agreements are unlikely to
evolve into binding customary rules.
It is well accepted that a norm gains the status of customary
international law if it has both state practice and opinio juris.34 The
state practice prong of this test, requiring widespread and consistent
adherence by states, would likely be satisfied in the case of current
nonbinding space agreements because a majority of space-faring
states abide by them in most cases, and some states have national
space legislation implementing their requirements. A future code of
conduct would probably satisfy the state practice requirement as
well, provided most or all space-faring states sign up and adhere to
it.3
However, nonbinding space agreements fail the opinio juris
prong of the test. Opinio juris requires that states believe a practice
to be legally obligatory and not merely voluntary, and space-faring
states have consistently stated that compliance with nonbinding
space agreements is not required by international law. This is
especially true of the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, the NPS
Safety Framework, and the proposed codes of conduct, whose texts
contain explicit provisions stating that they are not legally binding. 36
Some commentators, in arguing that sufficient opinio juris exists
Security and the European Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, 2009 (4)
DISARMAMENT FORUM 33, 34-35; Martha Mejia-Kaiser, Taking Garbage Outside: The
Geostationary Orbit and Graveyard Orbits, 49 PROC. OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW
OF OUTER SPACE 469, 469 (2006) (This article was published the year before the
COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines were adopted and thus discusses the
predecessor to the COPUOS Guidelines, the Inter-Agency Space Debris
However, Mejia-Kaiser's
Coordination Committee's Mitigation Guidelines.
arguments are equally if not more applicable to the COPUOS Guidelines.).
34. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
35. Two objections could be raised to the adequacy of state practice in the area
of space law. First, it may be argued that, because space exploration is barely half a
century old, any practices in the area would not be long-term enough to constitute
consistent state practice. Second, because so few states are engaged in space
operations, it is questionable whether state practice can be considered widespread
enough to support the formation of customary international law. While both
objections have theoretical merit, recent debates on quickly developing areas of
international law such as international environmental law have demonstrated that,
where opinio juris is also present, concerns such as these are unlikely to prevent the
formation of customary international law.
36. SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION GUIDELINES, supra note 23; U.N. Comm. on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Scientific & Technical Subcommittee & Int'l Atomic
Energy Agency, Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer
Space, Preface, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/934 (2009); Council Conclusions, supra note
31.
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in this area, claim that national space legislation implementing the
agreements at the national level, combined with high levels of
compliance, overrides consistent statements and textual provisions
asserting the nonbinding nature of these agreements.37 However,
this argument ignores the fact that states can impose obligations at
the national level without intending them to carry over to the
international level.
Furthermore, invoking high levels of
compliance to justify such a conclusion would erase the distinction
between opinio juris and state practice. In the end, neither national
space legislation nor widespread compliance can overcome states'
consistent assertions that they do not believe these practices to be
legally obligatory.
This conclusion is reinforced by an insightful comparison by
Anthea Roberts, a lecturer at the London School of Economics, of
traditional versus modern approaches to the formation of customary
international law. Roberts argues that throughout most of the
history of international law, long-term state practice over decades
and centuries was the driving factor in the creation and
identification of customary international law, and that opinio juris
was often inferred from longstanding practice. In recent years,
however, strong statements of opinio juris have been the driving
force in the formation of customary international law, with a few
instances of state practice deemed to be sufficient (hence the recent
phenomenon of "instant" customary international law). 38
The practices contained in nonbinding international space
agreements do not meet the requirements of either the traditional or
the modern approach to custom formation. State practice in outer
space is not long-term enough to be the driving force behind the
formation of international custom, especially with regard to the
more recent technical agreements, and statements of opinio juris
have been far from the strong and nearly unanimous sentiment
needed for opinio juris to be the leading factor. When considering
the legal effects of nonbinding agreements for the purposes of rule
of law, we must thus acknowledge that they are truly nonbinding
and will not likely become otherwise through customary
international law. 39
37. Mejia-Kaiser, supra note 33, at 473-75.
38. Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
InternationalLaw: A Reconciliation,95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 758-60 (2001).
39. It is worth noting, however, that nonbinding instruments can contribute to
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III. Current Debate
Having supplied the background for the debate on rule of law
in outer space, we may now turn to the debate itself. For years,
many space law scholars have argued that the international
community should return to binding treaties to address a number of
issues in space law, including orbital debris mitigation, space
tourism, and extraterrestrial property rights.40
Recently, some legal academics have begun to invoke rule of
law principles in support of this argument. One of the leading
proponents of this approach has been Stephan Hobe, a law
professor at the University of Cologne in Germany, director of the
International Institute of Space Law, and member of the European
Centre for Space Law. Hobe argues that the legal system governing
space activities does not comport with the rule of law because it
relies too heavily on nonbinding instruments.41 In Hobe's analysis,
the failure of the international community to widely ratify the Moon
Agreement was the first sign of a declining commitment to the rule
of law. 42 He further argues that, over the past thirty years, the rule
of law in outer space has been further degraded by the Principles,
the Debris Mitigation Guidelines, and the NPS Safety Framework.
To Hobe, these "soft law" instruments represent a breakdown in the
rule of law because they do not give rise to legally binding
commitments. 43 Additionally, Hobe objects to recent attempts to use
legal specificity in space law by helping to define a standard of care. The Liability
Convention uses a negligence standard for determining liability in outer space, and
negligence is a central factor in the national tort laws of many countries. Thus,
although compliance with technical agreements such as the Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines would not be binding per se, noncompliance could be used as evidence
of negligence in national and international court proceedings based on other,
binding sources of law.
40. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, ProceduralChallenges to Environmental Regulation of
Space Debris, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 635 (2003); Joseph S. Imburgia, Space Debris and its
Threat to National Security: A Proposalfor a Binding InternationalAgreement to Clean
Up the Junk, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 589 (2011); Natalie Pusey, The Case for
Preserving Nothing: The Need for a Global Response to the Space Debris Problem, 21
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 425 (2010); Jefferson H. Weaver, Illusion or Reality?
State Sovereignty in Outer Space, 10 B.U. INT'L L.J. 203 (1992); INT'L INST. OF SPACE
LAW, Statement of the Board of Directors of the InternationalInstitute of Space Law (IISL)
(Mar. 22, 2009), http://www.iislweb.org/docs/Statement%20BoD.pdf.
41. Stephan Hobe, The Importance of the Rule of Law for Space Activities, in 52
PROC. OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 351, 351 (2009).
42. Id. at 354.
43. Id. at 354-55.
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nonbinding instruments to interpret obligations set forth in prior
binding treaties. 44 This practice is problematic from a rule of law
perspective because, to the extent that such reinterpretations
actually constitute modifications, states are purporting to change
binding legal commitments using instruments that have no legal
force. This departure from the rule of law, Hobe argues, has
impaired the legitimacy and effectiveness of international space law.
Hobe's argument concludes with a call to return to binding treaties,
starting with a treaty on orbital debris mitigation.45
This argument, if valid, has serious implications for the
structure of international space law. It calls into question the past
thirty years of legal development, and it casts a shadow over current
proposals for nonbinding codes of conduct. Furthermore, although
the argument is directed at space law in particular, it has wideranging implications for public international law. States are relying
with increasing frequency on nonbinding agreements in areas
ranging from arms control to environmental law. Hobe's rule of law
objections to nonbinding space agreements thus suggest that this
wide range of international agreements has similar problems.
This argument and its implications, however, rest on the
assumption that nonbinding instruments are incompatible with the
rule of law. In order to evaluate this assumption, one must examine
the meaning of the rule of law and the goals that the rule of law
aims to achieve.

IV. What is the Rule of Law?
The rule of law has proven a difficult concept to define;
A
extensive scholarship has been produced on the subject.
comprehensive definition of the rule of law is beyond the scope of
this paper, but a general overview of the basic principles will go a
long way in evaluating possible applications of the concept to
international space law and public international law in general.
This section begins by discussing the basic distinction between

44. Specifically, Hobe cites the 1996 International Cooperation Declaration as
reinterpreting the "common benefit" principle in Art. I, para. 1 of the Outer Space
Treaty; the 2004 G.A. Resolution on the concept of the "launching state" as
reinterpreting that term as used in the Liability Convention and the Registration
Convention; and the 2007 G.A. Resolution reinforcing the registration requirements
contained in the Registration Convention. Id. at 355.
45. Id. at 357.
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formal rule of law, which looks only at how "law-like" a legal
system is, and substantive rule of law, which considers the actual
content of the laws as well. This discussion of formal and
substantive rule of law also considers the relative usefulness of these
two concepts, both in theoretical and practical terms. The second
part of this section considers more specific rule of law issues that
arise in the context of public international law.
A. Formal versus Substantive Rule of Law
Rule of law theorists identify two broad types of rule-of-law
definitions: formal and substantive. 46 The meaning of "the rule of
law" can vary considerably based on which of these two types is
being discussed, and the use of one type rather than the other will
often have a significant impact on the outcome of a rule-of-lawbased analysis. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the
strengths and weaknesses of formal and substantive rule of law in
order to evaluate recent rule-of-law based criticisms of space law.
This understanding is also essential for determining what changes,
if any, are necessary to bring space law into fuller compliance with
the rule of law.
The formal conception of the rule of law is based on ideal
characteristics that a law or legal system should have. Formal rule
of law evaluates a law or legal system based on the degree to which
it conforms to those characteristics. Typical characteristics of formal
rule of law include whether the law is published, available, and
clear, whether the law is applied only prospectively and not
retroactively, whether the law is capable of being followed (i.e., it
does not contain contradictory rules or require impossible actions),
whether laws are relatively stable, and whether the law as
administered is consistent with the law as announced.47
Government action can be conceptualized as consisting of general
rules (e.g., criminal statutes and the tax code) and particularized
46. See generally Paul P. Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of
Law: An Analytical Framework, 1997 PUB. L. 467.
47. Lon Fuller provides a fairly comprehensive list of such factors. In
describing the "eight desiderata" of law, Fuller argues that law should (1) consist of
general rules that are (2) publicized, (3) nonretroactive, (4) understandable, (5) not
contradictory, (6) not "requir[ing] conduct beyond the powers of the affected
party," (7) stable, and (8) administered as announced. According to Fuller, a
complete failure in any one of these areas results in something that cannot properly
be called "law." LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (1964).
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determinations (e.g., enforcement actions by police and the courts).
To conform to formal rule of law norms, the general rules should be
clear and relatively stable, and the particularized determinations
should be guided by the general rules.48
By requiring legal systems to conform to these requirements,
formalist rule of law seeks to achieve two main goals. First, the rule
of law seeks to ensure that the sovereign is bound by the rules that it
sets for itself. Under a system that conforms to the rule of law, the
sovereign cannot punish or constrain the conduct of its subjects
unless it does so according to preexisting laws. This requirement
distinguishes "rule of law" from "rule by law," under which the
sovereign uses law as a means to control its subjects but is not itself
bound by the law. 49 Second, the rule of law seeks to enable actors in
the system to plan their actions to avoid running afoul of the law.5 0
It is impossible to plan economic, political, and social behavior if
one cannot know what rules apply to one's conduct or if one has no
assurance that the rules will not be changed retroactively.
Furthermore, long-term planning is difficult unless laws are
relatively stable. Thus the formalist conception of the rule of law
serves the twin purposes of requiring the sovereign to abide by its
own laws and allowing subjects to make plans for the present and
future.
The formalist definition of the rule of law is explicitly not
concerned with the actual substance of the law, that is, whether a
law is "good" or "bad." A regime could be brutal and oppressive
but nevertheless comport with formal rule of law, so long as its
oppressive laws were known in advance, prospective, capable of
being followed, and so on. 51 The goals of formal rule of law would
be met in such a regime as well; the government would be bound by
the limits it chooses to place on itself, and the people living under
the regime would be able to plan their actions to avoid running
afoul of the law. For example, if there is a publicized, prospective
law that prohibits criticizing the government under penalty of

48. Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, 93 L.Q. REv. 195, 198 (1977).
49. Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 331,
333-34 (2008). The phrase "a government by law and not by men" expresses this
aspect of the rule of law. Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, 93 L.Q. REV. 195,
196-197 (1977).
50. Raz, supra note 48, at 202; Craig, supra note 46, at 469.
51. Raz, supra note 48, at 196; Craig, supra note 46, at 469.
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torture, one can avoid the penalty by not engaging in the prohibited
conduct. 52
Because formal rule of law does not take into account the
content of laws, proponents of the formal definition of rule of law
readily admit that it is only one virtue amongst many in a legal
system. Formal rule of law does not take into consideration values
such as freedom, justice, equality, and flexibility.53 Therefore, a legal
system should not merely seek to maximize formal rule of law; the
system must often balance rule of law against other important but
sometimes competing considerations. 54 Formal rule of law does not
reject this sort of balancing as illegitimate; rather, it recognizes that
strict adherence to the rule of law must and should yield to other
important values.55 For example, in a criminal law context, a society
that values substantive justice may provide for executive pardons,
even though strict adherence to the rule of law would not allow
arbitrary, individualized intervention by the executive in the
criminal adjudication process.
Furthermore, a legal system can comply with the requirements
of formal rule of law to greater and lesser degrees. This feature of
formal rule of law makes possible the sort of balancing described
above; adherence to the rule of law can be diminished to
accommodate other values without abandoning the rule of law
altogether. Laws can have varying degrees of clarity and stability,
administration of laws can be more consistent or less consistent, and
52. Chesterman lists Nazi Germany, Apartheid South Africa, and possibly
"certain aspects of the U.S. legal response to the global war on terror" as examples
of "wicked" legal regimes. Chesterman, supra note 49, at 337.
53. Raz, supra note 48, at 196.
54. Craig, supra note 46, at 469 ("We may feel that the rule of law virtues of
having clear, general norms must be sacrificed if the best or only way to achieve a
desired goal is to have more discretionary, open textured legal provisions. This
may be the case in circumstances when it is not possible to lay down in advance in
the enabling legislation clear, prospective rules in sufficient detail to cover all
eventualities. Modifications to the rule of law in this manner are not somehow
forbidden or proscribed. Given that it is only one virtue of a legal system it should
not prevent the attainment of other virtues valued by that system.").
55. Fuller describes this idea as the tension between "the internal and external
moralities of law," with "internal morality of law" referring to the goal of closely
adhering to formal rule of law and "external morality of law" referring to the
substantive goals which a society wishes to use law to achieve. He argues that
achieving this balance can be thought of in economic terms and that lawmakers
must consider the "marginal utility" of increasingly strict conformity with formal
rule of law ideals. FULLER, supra note 47, at 44.
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a legal system can be composed of a greater or lesser proportion of
retroactive laws. As twentieth century legal philosopher Lon Fuller
argues, perfect conformity with the criteria of formal rule of law
(i.e., a legal system whose laws are perfectly clear, entirely
nonretroactive, completely unchanging, etc.) is not possible, nor is it
even desirable due to the tradeoffs that would have to be made with
other values. Thus formal rule of law is an aspirational virtue,
achievable in varying degrees but not in perfection. 56 When legal
systems fail to comply satisfactorily with the rule of law, it is usually
not due to a complete failure of one criterion (for example, all the
laws are secret, or the laws change from minute to minute), but
rather because of a general deterioration of many of the factors.57 Of
course, some departures from the ideal are clearly worse than
others; certain infractions may be only superficial while others
fundamentally damage the overall rule of law.58 Compliance with
formal rule of law thus should not be seen as an absolute, but rather
as a matter of degree.
In contrast to formal rule of law, substantive rule of law looks
not only at the formal requirements described above but also at the
content of laws, requiring laws to meet certain minimum
substantive standards. Under the substantive conception, as Oxford
professor Paul Craig describes it, "[c]ertain substantive rights are
said to be based on, or derived from, the rule of law. The concept is
used as a foundation for these rights, which are then used to
distinguish between 'good' laws, which comply with such rights,
and 'bad' laws which do not." 59 For example, a substantive rule of
law theorist might say that a legal system does not comport with the
rule of law because it does not guarantee freedom of speech and
participation in the political process.
However, there is no
consensus among proponents of substantive rule of law as to which
specific rights should be required; the requirements vary from
56. Id. at 41-42.
57. Id. at 40.
58. Raz, supra note 48, at 199.
59. Craig, supra note 46, at 467. Ronald Dworkin, a proponent of a form of
substantive rule of law, defines it as such: "It assumes that citizens have moral
rights and duties with respect to one another, and political rights against the state
as a whole .... The rule of law on this conception is the ideal of rule by an accurate
public conception of individual rights. It does not distinguish, as the rule book [i.e.,
formal] conception does, between the rule of law and substantive justice; on the
contrary it requires, as part of the ideal of law, that the rules in the book capture
and enforce moral rights." RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 11-12 (1985).
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scholar to scholar and are usually drawn from that scholar's political
philosophy. 60 The substantive requirements may include political
rights, economic rights, both, or any other type of rights.
At first glance, the substantive conception of rule of law may
seem preferable to the formalist conception because it can include
important values that formal rule of law ignores. However, this
seeming advantage exposes substantive rule of law to a serious
critique. If a law or legal system does not comport with the relevant
political philosophy, then it necessarily does not comport with the
substantive rule of law. Thus, under a substantive conception, rule
of law loses its value as a concept distinct from the political
philosophy from which it draws its substantive component. 61
Losing this distinction is not only problematic from an analytical
point of view, but it is also troublesome from a practical standpoint,
in that criticism based on substantive rule of law can be misleading.
Claiming that a legal system does not comport with the rule of law
can sound significantly more damning than saying it does not
comport with a certain political philosophy, even though both
statements may mean the same thing. 62 Substantive conceptions of
rule of law thus have significant problems, both analytical and
practical.
The recent scholarship on rule of law in the context of
international space law has not stated whether it is applying a
formalist or substantive definition of the rule of law. Hobe's focus
on issues such as binding versus nonbinding instruments and

60. For example, Sir John Laws advocates a substantive rule of law theory
based on a Kantian philosophy of individual autonomy. John Laws, The
Constitution:Morals and Rights, 1996 PUB. L. 622, 630-32.
61. See Raz, supra note 48, at 195-96 ("If the rule of law is the rule of good law
then to explain its nature is to propound a complete social philosophy. But if so the
term lacks any useful function. We have no need to be converted to the rule of law
just in order to discover that to believe in it is to believe that good should
triumph."), and Craig, supra note 46, at 468-69 ("If you wish to argue about the
justness of society do so by all means. If you wish to defend a particular type of
individual right then present your argument. Draw upon the wealth of literature
which addresses these matters directly. Nothing however is to be gained by
cloaking whatever conclusion you reach in the mantle of the rule of law, since this
merely reflects the conclusion which has already been arrived at through the
relevant political theory.").
62. Craig, supra note 46, at 487 ("If the nub of the critique is posited upon the
substantive conception of the rule of law then intellectual honesty requires that this
is made clear, and it also demands clarity as to the particular theory of justice which
informs the critique."); Chesterman, supra note 49, at 336.
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proper processes for amending treaty obligations suggests that he
favors a formalist definition, as these issues raise considerations
such as the generality, clarity, and faithful administration of laws
more directly than considerations such as the justice and fairness of
laws. Furthermore, the formalist definition is more useful in this
context because it allows one to distinguish clearly between
attributes such as clarity and nonretroactivity on the one hand and
independent values such as fairness and flexibility on the other.
Thus, international space law, as well as other areas of international
law, should be evaluated under a formal conception of the rule of
law, as this conception will provide greater analytical clarity and
will be more useful in practice.
B. Rule of Law in Public International Law
Applying the rule of law to public international law presents
specific challenges, as there is uncertainty over the degree to which
certain rule of law concepts apply to the international legal system.
As mentioned above, one of the main goals of rule of law is to
ensure that the sovereign is bound by the rules it sets for itself when
dealing with its subjects. However, this focus on the relationship
between a sovereign and its subjects is difficult to apply in public
international law, which mostly concerns relations among coequal
sovereigns. 63 Although this aspect of rule of law has occasionally
played a role in some international law debates, for example in
debates regarding certain implications of the U.N.'s privileged place
in the international system, such issues are the exception rather than
the rule. 64
However, the second goal of the rule of law, that of ensuring
actors in the system can plan their actions in order to avoid running
afoul of the law, is more readily applicable to international law.
63. Chesterman, supra note 49, at 358.
64. One such issue is jus in bello, or laws governing states' conduct in war.
Scholars and policymakers employed rule of law concepts in the debate on whether
United Nations peacekeeping forces should be bound by the laws of war laid down
by United Nations treaties, despite the United Nations' privileged role among
international legal actors. This debate, unlike most debates on international law,
involved an element reminiscent of the relationship between a sovereign and its
subjects, in that the debate examined whether the U.N. itself should be bound by
the rules it had established for U.N. member states. Therefore, this issue was
susceptible to a rule-of-law analysis in a way that most areas of international law
are not. The unusual features of this issue demonstrate how rarely international
legal issues implicate sovereign-subject relationships. Id. at 352.
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States depend on clarity, nonretroactivity, and other formal rule of
law elements in planning their actions to comply with international
legal norms in the same way that individuals depend on these same
characteristics of law in planning their actions under domestic legal
systems. Rule of law arguments of this type have been made in
debates on the design of international organizations, with
commentators pointing to several ways in which the United Nations
falls short of rule of law ideals, such as the veto power for
permanent Security Council members, the Security Council's power
to delay prosecutions in the International Criminal Court, and the
fact that interpretation of the powers of U.N. organs is left to the
organs themselves, rather than an independent adjudicative body.65
Furthermore, as recent developments in international law
continue to expand its applicability directly to individuals (as
opposed to states, the traditional subject of international law) in
areas such as international criminal law, international legal systems
have come under increased scrutiny from a rule of law point of
view. For example, U.N. Security Council measures freezing the
assets of individuals suspected of funding terrorism without an
appeal procedure have been criticized on rule of law grounds, most
notably by the European Court of Justice. 66 As the trend of applying
international law directly to individuals and other nonstate entities
continues to expand into new areas, including private space
activities and space tourism, international law will come under
increasing pressure to ensure that all actors, both states and
individuals, have the ability to plan their actions to avoid running
afoul of newly developing norms and rules.

V. Applying Rule of Law Theory to Space Law
Despite these difficulties of applying the rule of law to public
international law, the rule of law can nevertheless be a useful tool in
evaluating when it is appropriate and even desirable for states to
use nonbinding agreements instead of binding treaties.
As
international space law is one area in which practitioners and

65. Id. at 350-53. By contrast, the World Trade Organization and International
Criminal Court have been viewed more favorably under a rule of law analysis, as
both have relatively independent adjudicative procedures. Id. at 355.
66. Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int'l Found. v.
Council of the European Union, 2008 E.C.R. 1-6351; Chesterman, supra note 49, at
351.
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academics are vigorously debating the proper role of nonbinding
agreements, the example of space law can be used to elucidate many
issues that are relevant to other areas of public international law as
well.
As described in Section III of this Article, some legal scholars
such as Stephan Hobe have recently argued that states must return
to the use of binding legal instruments in order to maintain rule of
law in outer space. Section V evaluates the force of that claim by
examining how well the argument holds up in light of general rule
of law theory as explored above. Applying rule of law theory, it
becomes clear that current space law is not nearly as problematic
from a rule of law perspective as has been suggested. First, the
failure to ratify the Moon Agreement widely does not represent a
breakdown in the rule of law because the Moon Agreement
embodies a substantive rather than formal view of the rule of law.
Furthermore, recent criticism based on the rule of law fails to
recognize that the rule of law in outer space must be balanced with
competing values, and that nonbinding instruments, while not
forming legal obligations, nevertheless further the goals of the rule
of law.
A. The Moon Agreement as Substantive Rule of Law
Stephan Hobe pinpoints the Moon Agreement's lack of
widespread ratification as the beginning of the decline of the rule of
law in international space law. 6 7 He and other proponents of this
argument claim that, because the Moon Agreement contained new
and "better" rules that would have been added to the legal order
governing outer space, it would have enhanced that legal order's
compliance with the rule of law. However, this argument fails to
distinguish between formal and substantive conceptions of rule of
law. The first four space treaties (the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue
Agreement, the Liability Convention, and the Registration
Convention) laid down rules in areas that previously had none or
added more specific content to general principles. These treaties
thus enhanced the rule of law in the space legal system because they
contributed to several of the elements of formal rule of law
discussed above - they laid down generally applicable rules that
were clear and widely publicized. These treaties thus gave states

67. Hobe, supra note 41, at 354.
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and other actors the guidance necessary to allow them to plan their
actions in compliance with international law in areas where no such
guidance had previously existed. A few provisions of the Moon
Agreement are similar in this regard to the previous space treaties.
The Moon Agreement provides more detailed procedures for
sharing scientific resultS68 and clarifies rules on nonappropriation of
lunar territory. 69 These provisions would contribute to formal rule
of law in the same way as the Rescue Agreement, Liability
Convention, and Registration Convention - by providing rules to
guide actors in areas where rules previously did not exist.
Proponents of Hobe's view argue that the same can be said of
the Moon Agreement's most significant provision, the requirement
that states share economic benefits derived from extraterrestrial
resources as the "common heritage of mankind." They argue that,
just as specific provisions in the Rescue Agreement, Liability
Convention, and Registration Convention clarify various general
principles set forth in the Outer Space Treaty, the Moon
Agreement's "common heritage of mankind" principle similarly
clarifies the provision in Art. I of the Outer Space Treaty that "[tjhe
exploration and use of outer space ... shall be the province of all
mankind." Further clarification is provided by the requirement that
states exploit lunar resources only through an international regime
that would ensure equitable distribution of those resources. Thus,
according to this argument, the Moon Agreement's "common
68. See Moon Agreement, art. 5.
69. Under the Outer Space Treaty, neither states nor individuals may claim
territory in space, on the Moon, or on other celestial bodies. Article II of the treaty
prohibits "national appropriation," and Article VI's requirement that states parties
take international responsibility for the activities of their nationals prevents
appropriation by individuals. These two articles taken together also prohibit states
parties from recognizing individual appropriation claims under national law. See
INT'L INST. OF SPACE LAW, Statement by the Board of Directors of the International
Institute of Space Law on Claims to Property Rights Regarding the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (2004), available at http://www.iislweb.org/docs/IISLOuter
SpaceTreaty Statement.pdf; INT'L INST. OF SPACE LAW, Further Statement by the
Board of Directors of the IISL on Claims to Lunar Property Rights (Mar. 22, 2009),
available at http://www.iislweb.org/docs/Statement%20BoD.pdf. However, this
has not stopped enterprising individuals from, for example, claiming the entire
Moon and purporting to sell lunar real estate by citing Article II's failure to mention
individuals and corporations explicitly. See, e.g., LUNAR EMBASSY, http://www.
lunarembassy.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2012). The Moon Agreement, Article 11(3),
would clarify this situation by prohibiting "any State, international
intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, national organization or any
natural person" from owning property on the Moon.
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heritage of mankind" provision provides the same kind of formal
rule of law benefits as the other space treaties.
This argument, however, fails in several ways. The Rescue
Agreement, Liability Convention, and Registration Convention all
directly elaborate on provisions in the Outer Space Treaty - the
specific obligations in these treaties are consistent with the
corresponding general provisions set out in the Outer Space Treaty.
By contrast, the Moon Agreement's "common heritage of mankind"
principle and its provisions on an international regime governing
natural resources would override and contradict the substance of
the Outer Space Treaty's general provisions. Helmut Tuerk, an
Austrian diplomat and vice president of the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea, recently observed that, although the Moon
Agreement's "common heritage of mankind" principle "seems to
echo" the Outer Space Treaty's "province of all mankind" principle,
the Outer Space Treaty's use of the latter, less restrictive concept can
be seen as denying rather than confirming the more restrictive
concept used in the Moon Agreement. 70 The general assumption
under international law is that states are free to appropriate natural
resources unless otherwise prohibited. Thus, by not placing limits
on resource appropriation, the Outer Space Treaty tacitly allows
The Moon
states to exploit extraterrestrial resources freely.
Agreement, by requiring states to operate through an international
regime, thus does not merely fill in the details of the Outer Space
Treaty, but changes those obligations.
The mere conclusion that the Moon Agreement would
contradict and change certain elements of prior law does not
necessarily mean that it cannot enhance the rule of law. If the new
rules on resource exploitation set out by the Moon Agreement were
more specific than the provisions they were replacing, then the
Moon Agreement would enhance the rule of law in much the same
way that previous space treaties did.71 However, although the

70. Tuerk, supra note 8, at 493. For an argument that the Outer Space Treaty's
"province of all mankind" principle traces its ideological roots to Soviet socialist
internationalism, rather than the ideological struggle between developing and
developed countries that gave rise to the Moon Agreement's "common heritage of
mankind" principle, see MARIETTA BENKO & KAi-UWE SCHROGL, Article I of the Outer
Space Treaty Reconsidered After 30 Years, in OUTLOOK ON SPACE LAW OVER THE NEXT 30
YEARS 67, 69 (Gabriel Lafferranderie & Daphn6 Crowther eds., 1997).
71. Note, however, that because one of the factors of formal rule of law is
stability, the benefit of the additional clarity would need to be significant enough to
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"common heritage of mankind" principle and the accompanying
provisions for setting up an international regime may contain more
details than the Outer Space Treaty's "province of all mankind"
principle, these rules would not in practice be more specific. Article
11 of the Moon Agreement provides for the establishment of an
international regime to govern lunar resource exploitation and
describes in general terms the main purposes of the regime.
However, no attempt has been made to describe how the regime
would work in practice. 72 If the Moon Agreement was widely
ratified, the international community would thus abandon a rule
under which states may freely exploit extraterrestrial resources in
favor of a rule under which states could only exploit such resources
through an as yet unestablished international regime.
Furthermore, the only indication given as to how this regime
would operate is that its decisions would be guided by vague
principles such as the "equitable sharing by all States Parties in the
benefits derived from those resources" and "special consideration"
for "the interests and needs of developing countries[.]"73 Under the
Moon Agreement as it currently stands, states contemplating the
possibility of extraterrestrial resource utilization would be hard
pressed to discern what specific rules would actually govern their
operations. 74 Thus, the Moon Agreement's "common heritage of
mankind" principle, which is the "core provision" of the
agreement,75 would not enhance formal rule of law but rather would
impair it. This considerable uncertainty in the area of lunar resource
exploitation would more than outweigh the Moon Agreement's
relatively minor contributions to formal rule of law in the areas of
scientific data sharing and nonappropriation of territory.
outweigh the negative effect of changing the rule.
72. Tuerk, supra note 8.
73. Outer Space Treaty, art. 3.
74. Of course, the Moon Agreement itself is not intended to provide specific
rules, but rather is meant to pave the way for future protocols that would flesh out
the details of the regime, as was the case with the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3, 97. If or when these protocols are in place, then the regime envisioned
by the Moon Agreement could fairly be said to increase formal rule of law. At this
point, however, the uncertainty created by the fact that space actors do not know
what rules the protocols would contain, when they would come into force, or even
whether the international community would be able to agree on them gives rise to
serious rule of law problems.
75. Tuerk, supra note 8, at 497.

2012]

The Rule of Law in Outer Space

313

The Moon Agreement's "common heritage of mankind"
principle thus would not contribute to formal rule of law. If,
however, one takes a substantive view of the rule of law, with the
"substance" provided by the political philosophy of equitable
resource distribution behind the "common heritage of mankind"
principle, then this portion of the Moon Agreement would
contribute to the rule of law, in that it would bring space law into
closer alignment with that political philosophy. The argument that
the Moon Agreement should be widely ratified in order to enhance
the rule of law thus must be understood to adopt a substantive
definition of rule of law. 76 This argument demonstrates the
problems of substantive conceptions of the rule of law discussed in
Section IV above. The main goal of the Moon Agreement, to ensure
that all states benefit from the use of lunar resources, may indeed be
a worthy goal that states should work to achieve. However, that
argument should be framed in terms of political theory and social
justice, not rule of law. It is misleading to say that the Moon
Agreement must be ratified in order to bring international space law
into closer compliance with the rule of law when one actually means
to argue that the Moon Agreement must be ratified in order to bring
international space law into closer compliance with theories of
development economics and economic justice. Failing to distinguish
between substantive political philosophy and formal rule of law in
this way not only obscures the political assumptions behind one's
arguments. It also robs the rule of law of its value as a concept
distinct from political philosophy by which one can evaluate a legal
system such as the international law of outer space.77
However, besides the rule of law debate surrounding the Moon
Agreement, most of the recent literature on rule of law in outer
76. The very structure of the Moon Agreement, consisting of a general
framework to be supplemented later by protocols containing more specific rules,
demonstrates that the primary aim of the Agreement is substantive rather than
formal or procedural. If the authors of the Moon Agreement were truly concerned
with enhancing the rule of law, the problems described in the preceding paragraph
could have been avoided by drafting it as a package deal, including the specific
rules that would govern the regime, to be adopted all at once. The authors of the
Agreement likely chose a two-step structure because they perceived that it would
be easier to find support for the sweeping substantive changes envisioned by the
Agreement in principle first, with future negotiations for specific commitments
eased by the general expectations created by the initial Agreement, than to attempt
to negotiate up front the specifics of a regime based on the "common heritage of
mankind" principle.
77. See supra Section IV.A.
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space seems to avoid the pitfalls of substantive rule of law and
adopts a formal definition of the concept.78 Therefore, this Article
will now turn to an evaluation of current and future space law
through the lens of formal rule of law.
B. Balancing Rule of Law and Other Virtues
In light of the formal conception of rule of law, recent
scholarship is correct in its assertion that nonbinding space law
instruments provide a lower level of rule of law than binding
treaties would.
Use of nonbinding instruments decreases
conformity with several elements of formal rule of law. Nonbinding
instruments reduce clarity in the law because they introduce
uncertainty as to whether and how often the rules will be followed.
For similar reasons, nonbinding rules call into question the degree
to which the rules are administered as announced. However, the
fact that nonbinding instruments provide a lower level of rule of
law does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that states should
abandon them and exclusively use binding treaties to make space
law, any more than rule of law in the criminal law context demands
the discontinuance of executive pardons. Rule of law, as theorists
such as Fuller and Craig remind us, is just one virtue in a legal
system, and it must be balanced against other competing virtues. In
the context of space law, one such important yet competing virtue is
flexibility.
Flexibility to deal with unanticipated circumstances is an
important value in any legal system, but it is especially so in
international space law. The use of outer space for exploration,
science, and commerce is still in its infancy, and space technology is
rapidly advancing.79 Scientific opinion on what constitutes "best
practices" in important technical areas such as orbital debris
mitigation and NPS usage is thus likely to change in the coming
years and decades, due to new developments in technology and
research on the impact of current practices. Space law must be able
to adapt quickly to these changes. Current space law achieves this
flexibility by using nonbinding instruments, such as the 2007 Space
Debris Mitigation Guidelines and the 2009 Nuclear Power Sources
Nonbinding
Safety Framework, to set technical standards.
78. See supra Section IVA, last paragraph.
79. See G6rardine Meishan Goh, Softly, Softly Catchee Monkey: Informalism and the
Quiet Development of InternationalSpace Law, 87 NEB. L. REV. 725, 732-34 (2009).
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instruments allow states to adapt their practices quickly to the latest
science and technology, without breaching a legally binding
commitment.
Furthermore, the international community is usually able to
change a nonbinding agreement more quickly than it can amend a
treaty, because nonbinding agreements have lower stakes
internationally and fewer procedural hurdles to ratification and
implementation at the domestic level.80 If technical best practices
were set in a binding treaty, and those best practices later change, it
would take years to amend the treaty. In the meantime, states
would be faced with the dilemma of following the treaty at the
expense of the outer space environment or deliberately breaching it
in order to comply with scientifically determined best practices. In
such a situation, most states would likely deliberately breach the
treaty, which would send a message, either explicitly or implicitly,
that binding space treaties should not be followed if contradicted by
mainstream scientific opinion. The damage that this message would
cause to the rule of law would likely equal, if not outweigh, the rule
of law benefits that the treaty had initially provided.
One concrete example of the need for flexibility in technical
areas of space utilization is the disposal of satellites in geostationary
Earth orbit (GEO). A satellite in GEO circles the Earth at a speed
that allows it to remain at all times directly above the same point on
the surface - it thus circles the Earth at the same rate that the Earth
is rotating. A satellite's orbital speed is determined by the altitude
at which it orbits; therefore all satellites in GEO must be positioned
at roughly the same altitude (about 36,000 kilometers).81 Because all
satellites in GEO must travel in the same narrow band, a
geostationary satellite that has reached the end of its useful life
should be removed to avoid overcrowding this valuable orbital
altitude. Satellites at lower altitudes are often disposed of by
steering them into the Earth's atmosphere to burn up on reentry, but
geostationary satellites are at too high an altitude for this solution to
be feasible. Therefore, current best practice is for satellite operators
to move decommissioned geostationary satellites into a "graveyard
orbit" several hundred kilometers above GEO.82 The use of
80. Kai Raustiala, Form and Substance in InternationalAgreements, 99 AM.
L. 581, 597 (2005).
81. Mejia-Kaiser, supra note 33, at 469.
82. Id.

J. INT'L

316

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 35:2

graveyard orbits is provided for in both current and proposed
nonbinding agreements. The Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines
call upon states to leave decommissioned satellites "in an orbit
above the GEO region such that they will not interfere with, or
return to, the GEO region,"83 and the European Union Draft Code of
Conduct incorporates this guideline by reference to the Space Debris
Mitigation Guidelines.84
Although graveyard orbits are currently considered the best
feasible way to dispose of satellites in GEO, it is not hard to see that
this opinion might change in the future.
Technological
developments in satellite design or debris removal techniques may
significantly reduce the cost of disposing of geostationary satellites
in Earth's atmosphere. Alternatively, further research on the impact
of graveyard orbits on current and future space operations may
demonstrate that placing satellites in graveyard orbits is more
hazardous than once thought. Because the Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines are nonbinding, they provide the flexibility that is
necessary to deal with future technological and scientific changes.
It is worth noting that flexibility can also be achieved in binding
treaties, by drafting the substantive terms of the treaty to be
intentionally vague or ambiguous. Leaving treaty terms open to
later interpretation allows states to respond to unanticipated
breaching their treaty
without technically
developments
85
However, from a formal rule of law perspective,
obligations.
binding but vague treaties may be worse than nonbinding but
Current and planned
substantively detailed agreements.
nonbinding space agreements (the Principles, Guidelines, and
planned Codes of Conduct) contain a fairly high level of detail,
especially compared to the binding space treaties that preceded
them. While actors cannot be certain that the nonbinding rules set
down in these agreements will always be followed, at least the
actors know what the rules are and can determine the standards by
which their and others' conduct will be judged. By contrast, if states
had attempted to use binding but vague treaties to address technical
issues such as orbital debris and nuclear power sources, actors

83. SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION GUIDELINES, supra note 23, Guideline 7.

84. Council Conclusions, supra note 31.
85. Raustiala, supra note 81, at 594. Raustiala cites the Cartegena Protocol on
Biodiversity as an example of a treaty that is legally binding but has ambiguous
substantive provisions.
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would not even be able to determine what rules apply in those
areas, let alone know with any certainty what actions others might
take. Binding but vague treaties would thus likely result in more
uncertainty, not less, than is produced by the use of nonbinding
agreements. 86
The flexibility that nonbinding agreements provide, then, seems
to be the best alternative in this area of law. However, it should be
noted that outer space activities are currently the domain of a small
group of developed countries, and many developing countries may
have different views about the virtues that are important in a legal
system governing space. Regarding flexibility, states not currently
engaged in space operations may argue that the United States and
other space powers should not engage in space activities at all
unless they are reasonably certain that those activities will not later
be found to have been harmful to the space environment. However,
this position would not be advanced by enshrining current best
To return to the example of
practices in binding treaties.
geostationary satellites, the developing-country objection to
flexibility would require not a binding rule that states use graveyard
orbits, which is the position advocated by those calling for a return
to treaties, but rather it would require states to stop using
geostationary satellites altogether until more research is conducted
and better technology for their disposal is available. It is in no one's
interests that states be forced by a lack of flexibility to continue
outdated practices that are known to be more damaging than
necessary. This objection does, however, have more force in the
context of self-judging exceptions, which will be discussed in the
following subsection.
C. Promoting Rule of Law through Nonbinding Agreements
Although nonbinding instruments provide for greater
flexibility in technical areas of space law, they do not represent an
abandonment of the rule of law. Compliance with the rule of law is
a matter of degree, as Fuller has made clear, and nonbinding
instruments play a role in fostering the rule of law in the space legal
system. One way to evaluate their effectiveness in promoting the
rule of law is by examining the degree to which current nonbinding
86. Of course, most proponents of a return to treaties advocate agreements that
are both binding and unambiguous. However, such treaties would lose the benefits
of flexibility, as discussed above.

318

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 35:2

instruments and planned codes of conduct fulfill the goals of the
rule of law. As explained above, the goal of allowing actors to plan
their actions without running afoul of the law is much more relevant
in the context of public international law than is the goal of
regulating sovereign-subject relationships. Therefore, an analysis of
the place of nonbinding agreements in the rule of law in outer space
must focus on the degree to which international space law provides
enough certainty for states to plan their activities in outer space.
The current nonbinding agreements and planned codes of
conduct to a large extent fulfill this goal, at least at the current stage
of space utilization. Space-faring states, and increasingly private
space companies, need to know the rules that they will be expected
to follow in technical areas such as orbital debris mitigation, nuclear
Current
power source use, and space situational awareness.
nonbinding agreements are sufficiently clear, stable, and
nonretroactive to serve this purpose, and the adoption of a code of
conduct for space activities would further this goal as well.
Nonbinding agreements thus go a long way in allowing states and
private companies to plan outer space operations according to the
rules, even though many rules on technical issues are nonbinding.
The ability to know the rules by which one's own conduct will
be measured, however, is not the only way that rule of law allows
actors in a legal system to plan their actions. An actor must also
know what rules apply to others so that the actor knows to what
degree it can rely on others to do or not to do certain actions. For
example, much of the benefit of regimes like the Space Debris
Mitigation Guidelines and a space code of conduct is lost if satellite
operators must still be concerned about unexpected collisions with
debris produced by the noncompliance of other states or other
private companies. Nonbinding agreements can advance this aspect
of rule of law as well, but only if compliance is relatively high.87
However, many nonbinding space agreements contain selfjudging exceptions, especially for mission costs. Under such an
exception, if a party declares that compliance with the substantive
provisions of the agreement would be so expensive as to make the
mission unfeasible, it is excused from complying with that
87. G~rardine Goh's observation that "treaty and non-treaty [i.e., nonbinding]
agreements have historically enjoyed largely the same compliance rates" suggests
that nonbinding agreements may be as helpful as binding treaties in anticipating
the actions of other parties. Goh, supra note 79, at 734-35.
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requirement. These exceptions thus allow parties to comply with
the letter of the agreement while not complying with the substance
or spirit. Like outright noncompliance, self-judging exceptions
would not be a great problem if they were limited to truly
exceptional situations. Unfortunately, in some areas they seem to be
becoming more the rule than the exception; for example, several
rocket programs of various countries, citing costs, routinely leave
upper stages of rockets in orbit, where they could pose a threat to
satellites and other spacecraft.88 This practice would be prohibited
by the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, were it not for the cost
exception. 89 States and space companies should thus endeavor to
invoke self-judging exceptions only in truly exceptional situations in
order to allow others to depend on a high level of compliance.
Despite this problem, however, nonbinding instruments still
contribute to the rule of law because they allow states and space
companies to plan their own actions in accordance with relevant
technical rules, and they do provide some basis for predicting the
actions of others. 90
88. For example, the European Space Agency's Space Debris Mitigation for
Agency Projects allows the release of "at most one additional launch vehicle
element" (such as the upper stage of a rocket) for launches of a single payload, and
two additional launch vehicles for launches of multiple payloads, while the U.S.
Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices requires that "[e]ach
instance of planned release of debris larger than 5 mm in any dimension that
remains on orbit for more than 25 years should be evaluated and justified on the
basis of cost effectiveness and mission requirements." Heiner Klinkrad & Ulrike M.
Bohlmann, Requirements on Space Debris Mitigationfor ESA Projects: Presentation to
the 48th session of the Legal Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space 8 (2009), EUROPEAN SAPCE AGENCY, available at http://www.unoosa.
org/pdf/pres/1sc2009/pres-07.pdf; NASA ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAM OFFICE, U.S.
GOV'T ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES, available at http://
www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/USGOD StandardPractices.pdf.
89. The developing-country objection to flexibility, mentioned above in Section
IV.B, is more applicable in the context of self-judging exceptions. Many nonspacefaring states would argue that if the space powers cannot conduct a mission in
accordance with the relevant guidelines because of cost, then they should not
conduct that mission at all. The counterargument to this objection is that even
countries that do not conduct space activities directly nevertheless benefit from
communications and weather satellites, space science, and other space activities. If
not for self-judging exceptions, satellite services would be much more expensive for
all states and possibly too expensive for some developing states. This aspect of the
debate is thus more of a policy question and not very relevant to a formal rule of
law analysis, except to the extent that it affects the ability of parties to plan their
actions.
90. As discussed above, nonbinding agreements with specific, unambiguous
provisions (such as the Principles, Guidelines, and proposed Codes of Conduct)
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Finally, Hobe's objection to using nonbinding instruments to
reinterpret or amend binding treaties can also be analyzed in light of
the goal of the rule of law to allow parties to plan their actions.
Again, one of the main potential problems stems from a lack of
clarity, in that actors are unsure whether their conduct will be
judged by the more general binding instrument or by the specific
requirements of the later nonbinding one. Similarly, this practice
may create doubt as to whether the binding treaty will be
administered as it has been announced, and if the provisions are
contradictory it may be impossible to follow both simultaneously.
The more the binding and nonbinding provisions diverge, the worse
these rule of law problems become. If the latter instrument is
simply a clarification of the prior and remains true to its text and
spirit, the nonbinding provision can be understood as merely an
authoritative interpretation of the treaty, deserving deference
because it was adopted by the same body that drafted and debated
the treaty. If, however, the latter provision drastically changes and
contradicts the obligation contained in the treaty, it would raise such
serious problems of clarity, reliable administration, and
impossibility that actors may find it impossible to determine what
rules they are supposed to follow. These problems can arise not
only in space law, but also in other areas of international law in
which nonbinding agreements are used to modify binding treaties.
Fortunately, the situation in current space law falls much closer
to the former end of this spectrum than the latter. The Declaration
on International Cooperation elaborates on the "province of all
mankind" provision in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, but to the
extent that both are statements of broad principles rather than
specific rules, any modification by the Declaration does not
introduce significant confusion relating to legal rules. 91 The
"Application of the Concept of the 'Launching State'" resolution,
besides calling on states to observe their obligations under the space
also result in a greater level or rule of law than nominally binding but substantively
ambiguous treaties, because the nonbinding agreements provide more guidance
than ambiguous treaties.
91. Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular
Account the Needs of Developing Countries, G.A. Res. 51/122, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/51/122 (Dec. 13, 1996); Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, Art. I, opened for signatureJan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S.
205.
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treaties, encourages states to enact national laws to supervise nongovernmental space activities, to coordinate more closely with each
other on joint launches, and to report on and to harmonize practices
concerning ownership transfers of orbiting objects. 92 The General
Assembly Resolution on the registration of space objects encourages
states to provide the information required under the Registration
Convention in a standardized format, and it requests that states
update registration information in case of a change in orbit. 93 Both
of these resolutions are thus fully consistent with prior treaties and
are closer to authoritative interpretations than to substantive
modifications or contradictions.
Unlike the nonbinding agreements relating to technical "best
practices," there are not significant interests in flexibility or other
values here to justify deviation from rule of law ideals. However,
these reinterpretations of space treaties through nonbinding
resolutions have not had a large negative effect on the rule of law in
outer space. Therefore, while critics are correct that it would be
better to make this sort of clarification through formal treaty
amendments or new binding treaties, the problems caused in
practice, if any, are minor.

VI. Conclusion
The preceding analysis demonstrates that rule-of-law based
concerns in the field of space law are not nearly as serious as has
previously been suggested. Current space law comes very close to
striking an appropriate balance between the rule of law and
flexibility. High-level principles, such as claims of territory and
military activities in space, assistance to astronauts, and liability for
damage caused by space objects, require a high degree of
compliance with the rule of law in order to inform states of their
basic rights and responsibilities, but are unlikely to be affected by
changing technology and thus require low levels of flexibility.
These high-level principles are thus set down in binding treaties that
favor rule of law over flexibility. In contrast, technical-level best
practices that require a high degree of flexibility are established by
92. Application of the Concept of the "Launching State," G.A. Res. 59/115, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/59/115, U.N. GAOR 59th Sess. (Dec. 10, 2004).
93. Recommendations on Enhancing the Practice of States and International
Intergovernmental Organizations in Registering Space Objects, G.A. Res. 62/101,
U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess.,U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/101 (Dec. 17, 2007).
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nonbinding instruments that provide this flexibility while still
supporting an acceptable degree of adherence to the rule of law.
The relatively minor rule-of-law problems that exist in the area of
technical guidelines could be largely resolved by limiting the use of
self-judging exceptions. Rule of law considerations thus do not call
for a return to binding treaties in international space law. Rather,
rule of law theory stresses that rule of law must be balanced against
competing virtues such as flexibility, and these virtues demand a
more nuanced approach than one that merely seeks to maximize
formal rule of law.
These conclusions regarding the appropriate use of nonbinding
agreements in space cooperation also have broader implications for
other areas of public international law. Many areas of international
relations are now characterized by uncertainty due to changing
technology coupled with a pressing need for cooperation.
International environmental law, for example, is one area in which
this dilemma is clearly present. Applying the lessons learned from
the above analysis of space law, one may conclude that the rule of
law does not preclude the use of nonbinding agreements in such
areas. Indeed, nonbinding agreements may be more effective at
achieving states' policy goals in these areas, especially when the
subject matter of the agreement is highly technical in nature. While
more study is needed on the implications of rule of law in other
areas of public international law, the past thirty years of nonbinding
agreements on outer space have demonstrated that it is possible for
such agreements to contribute to the rule of law.
Lon Fuller stresses that while rough adherence to the rule of
law can provide a floor below which no legal system should go,
perfect adherence to the rule of law at the expense of all other
virtues would not yield a desirable legal system. In stressing this
limitation of the rule of law, he states that "the most we can expect
of constitutions and courts is that they save us from the abyss[.]" 94
Fortunately, in the abyss of space, the rule of law is far exceeding
Fuller's modest predictions, through both binding and nonbinding
agreements.

94. FULLER, supra note 47, at 44.

